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Nation
JOHN E. JOSEPH
Languages and Nations
The term “nation,” as opposed to “state” or “federation” or “territory” or other related 
terms, implies the existence of a people united either by common ancestry or some 
other deep cultural bond. Although the different natures of the bonds mean that nations 
themselves are never identical in makeup—indeed, in everyday discourse “nation” can 
be interchangeable with “state”—they are spoken of and imagined as if all still fi t the 
historical concept of nation that underpinned their formation from the early modern period 
onward.
The concept of the nation, and the particular features that mark one nation off from 
another, have always led back to language as the most fundamental of all cultural differ-
ences. The analysis and teaching of languages has inevitably been bound up with projects 
to create and spread belief in some version of a nation—though 20th-century modernism, 
a movement defi ned by its “deliberate break with classical and traditional forms or methods” 
(OED), allowed linguists and language practitioners to go temporarily into denial about 
the fact.
National language policies have proven effective in proportion as they take account of 
the beliefs, desires, and aspirations of the people affected (see Wright, 2004; Joseph, 2006). 
In determining where the boundaries of a nation lie in terms of both population and territory, 
and whether a given individual belongs to a particular nation or not, the matter of what 
language is spoken has long seemed to offer the surest and most objective criterion. Yet 
no nation has ever been linguistically homogeneous—bilingualism and multilingualism 
have always been the norm for most societies—and the way in which languages spread 
is a cultural matter disconnected from genetic ethnicity.
There is, then, a gap between the reliance on language to defi ne the nation, and the 
heterogeneous nature of language itself. The gap is fi lled by ideology and myth, and it is 
here above all that is located the importance of language (or rather, of what people believe 
about language) for nationalism. Renaissance Europe knew this both through its religious 
and its philosophical heritage. The Bible taught in Genesis 10:5 that, after the Flood, the 
grandsons of Noah spread across the earth, each forming his own nation, with its own 
language. The ancient pedigree for empiricism in the early modern period led back to 
Epicurus, who believed that different languages refl ected the different physical makeup 
of the nations who spoke them.
Revolutions and imperial expansion over what historians call the “long 19th century” 
(the 1780s through World War I) brought about a second phase in the conceptualization 
of nations, with language taking even more of a central role in order to legitimize the 
creation of states which combined a number of nations in the traditional sense, often 
nations which had long been hostile to one another. Particularly in German lands that 
were being taken over by Napoleon, writers such as Fichte, drawing on earlier work by 
Herder, strove to locate resistance in the belief that people who share a language share a 
national spirit or soul, and have a natural right to occupy a state with boundaries corres-
ponding to that of their linguistic nation.
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This ideology, which in recent years has been referred to as “language nationalism,” 
would still be the guiding principle when the map of Europe was redrawn at the end of 
World War I. It would reach its culmination in Nazi Germany, with its project to restore 
the Aryan nation to primal purity by eliminating foreign elements such as Jews, whose 
racial difference was established principally on linguistic grounds, according to the research 
of Hutton (1999).
Language nationalism is a double-edged sword. It gives meaning to people’s lives by 
marking and manifesting their identity and allowing them to bond with those who share 
that identity. But it does so at the price of making it impossible to ignore differences 
vis-à-vis other groups, thus helping to keep opposition and hostility alive. The “one nation, 
one language” doctrine, Romantic and oversimplifi ed as it was, allowed many oppressed 
peoples to gain their independence in 1919, in some cases after centuries of foreign 
domination. Yet it was linked to the doctrines that fed into “scientifi c racism” and were 
ultimately used to justify genocide.
Language, Knowledge, Religion, and Nation
In Europe, for over 1,000 years, “language” referred in the West almost exclusively to 
Latin, and in the East to Greek. The vernaculars which ordinary people used with one 
another in everyday discourse were recognized to exist, but not to have the status of “a 
language.” The fact that they differed from village to village made them appear unsuited 
to functions involving the transmission (through space or time) of real, permanent know-
ledge. Even after this way of seeing things began to change in the late medieval period, 
the basic one-language model remained in place: one dialect came to be a standardized 
form of the national vernacular. This process took a long time to transpire—indeed it is 
still transpiring—and may never reach completion, as certain symbolic functions in law, 
religion, and education continue to be reserved for the classical languages.
Initially, the main obstacle to seeing vernacular ways of speaking as languages was that 
Latin and Greek had “grammar,” as witnessed by treatises on the subject, and the variation 
in them was controlled by the fact that they were “dead,” since even Greek did not have 
native speakers of its classical form. This fulfi lled (or perhaps determined) the expectations 
of what a language had to be, given the exigencies of maintaining and transmitting know-
ledge as noted above. When a person’s enlightenment was revealed by one’s control of the 
Latin terminology for the highest philosophical concepts, it was diffi cult to imagine such 
knowledge being held and safely transmitted in a vernacular that was itself “irregular” in 
two senses, exhibiting great variation from locale to locale (and even in the usage of a 
single individual), and lacking the formalized rules of a grammar book.
This is why, when Dante set out to imagine (or in his word, “discover”) an “Italian 
language” at the start of the 14th century, the term he used for it was volgare illustre—
volgare because it belonged to the ordinary people as well as to the learned, illustre because 
it could be the vehicle of enlightenment, of the highest knowledge. This, he realized, would 
take some work. De vulgari eloquentia laid out the work plan, and the Divina commedia then 
performed the result. Italian became the model that was followed in the creation of other 
“illuminated vernaculars.” Once Dante had demonstrated that a vernacular could be not 
only a language, but a language of enlightenment, and could form the basis of a specifi -
cally national literary culture (even where the political nation did not exist, as, again, Italy 
would not for centuries to come), a new era opened in the politics of language in Europe. 
The fi rst effect was simply that writing in the vernacular became semi-respectable, and 
more people—though still a small minority—began doing it. With movable type and 
print capitalism in the 16th century, it emerged that the potential market for books in the 
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vernacular was more sizeable (though less prestigious) than for books in Latin. Profi tability 
accelerated if large print runs were sold, which could happen only if a large audience 
could read the language.
This brought a new twist to the old language–power–resources nexus. While scholars 
and clergymen concerned themselves with enlightenment in the language, which the 
borrowing of words from Latin and Greek gave the impression of increasing, publishers 
knew that a certain economy between learned and popular language was necessary if the 
readership was to be wide enough to make a book profi table. Without profi ts, funds could 
not be raised to publish any more books, since those with the funds would invest them 
elsewhere. But something else was happening in the 16th century: the “emergence” of the 
concept of the nation. I put the word emergence in quotation marks because it suggests a 
nondeliberate process, but in fact it is clear from the documentary record that vast efforts 
were undertaken by governments to get the populace to buy into the idea of the nation. 
The “national language” was an obvious concept to seize upon to promote belief in the 
internal unity of the nation and its difference from its neighbors and rivals—at the most 
fundamental level, that of knowledge itself. Even if these ideas were not clearly articulated 
until the early 19th century (see for example Joseph, 2004, pp. 109–15 on Fichte), they are 
implicit in much of the writing and cultural activity surrounding language from Dante 
through to the end of the 18th century—and nowhere more so than in those mostly northern 
European countries which took the nationalist route of breaking from Rome to form their 
own national church.
Myhill (2006, p. 13) has put forward the thesis that “If a pre-modern national church 
had been established (in practice all such churches to be discussed here were established 
by 1600), then even in modern times national identity based upon religious affi liation has 
proven to be more important than identity based upon spoken language.” This is either 
because “the group was secure in terms of its political and military sovereignty but wanted 
to emphasize its religious sovereignty as well,” or because “the group was in a tenuous 
position, politically and militarily, in terms of maintaining its independence or autonomy, 
and wished to emphasize its distinctiveness by making its separateness organizationally 
explicit.” This thesis holds potential for future research, though at this stage Myhill’s 
presentation of facts may be too selective, and an account which allows the same result 
either because a group is secure or because it is weak is explanatorily unsatisfying.
Writing the Nation
The beginnings of modern political nationalism in early modern Europe faced a funda-
mental problem: on the ground, nothing corresponded to the “national languages” that 
nations ought to possess, according to the Bible and the Epicureans. The spoken vernacu-
lars were a patchwork of local dialects so diverse that one did not have to travel more 
than a day or two from home before ceasing to understand or be understood, particularly 
if a mountain or major river had to be crossed. The business of church and state, and 
anything that required a written record, was with few exceptions done in Latin, which, 
being pan-European, did not qualify as anyone’s national language. And yet, all that 
“language” proper was taken to mean was defi ned by Latin, with its grammars, its 
rhetorical tradition, its literary heritage, and its status as the offi cial scriptural language of 
Western Christianity.
Linguistically equipping nascent nations required creating for their vernacular speech 
all those cultural embodiments that Latin possessed. The fi rst obstacle was the formal 
diversity. Latin itself was pronounced differently in different parts of Europe, yet by cul-
tivating a high literary and rhetorical style, modeled on classical authors, its written form 
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was kept aloof and its diversity limited. For this to be achieved with a national language, 
a primarily written form would need to be fi xed, and there was no lack of educated men 
eager to put the dialect of their own region forward as the basis of that written language. 
It would, after all, mean that the nation would look to their region as its spiritual center, 
and to them personally as its cultural authorities.
The ideology of language nationalism holds not only that a people and its language are 
coterminous, but that the language embodies the soul of the people, whose cultural respon-
sibility it is to keep the language pure, probe its history, and ensure that its “correct” form 
is spread throughout the population as much as possible. In fact a little historical evidence 
could be stretched a long way; Smith (1998) has emphasized how much of the effort of 
nationalism construction is aimed at reaching back to the past in the interest of “ethno-
symbolism.” As Hobsbawm has pointed out, the national standard language is, like the 
nation itself, a discursive construction:
National languages . . . are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to 
be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national 
mind. They are usually attempts to devise a standardized idiom out of a multiplicity of 
actually spoken idioms, which are downgraded to dialects . . . (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 51)
Hobsbawm defi nes the standard language as “a sort of platonic idea of the language, 
existing behind and above all its variants and imperfect versions” (p. 57). A “mystical 
identifi cation of nationality” then occurs with this idea of the language, an identifi cation 
Hobsbawm considers “much more characteristic of the ideological construction of nation-
alist intellectuals, of whom Herder is the prophet, than of the actual grassroots users of 
the idiom. It is a literary and not an existential concept” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 57). It should 
be noted, however, that while it may be historically true that the national/standard language 
is the property of nationalist intellectuals rather than of ordinary users during the period 
when it is initially being constructed, this ceases to be the case once it enters the educational 
sphere, and once education is widespread. The linguistic ideology then becomes common 
national property, as least as likely to fi nd fi rm belief among the working classes who do 
not control it as among the upper classes who do.
Nations and Languages as Imagined Communities
The nation as reconceived since this period has been defi ned by Benedict Anderson as an 
“imagined political community.”
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion . . . Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-
consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. (Anderson, 1991, p. 6)
As with the “discovery” of a national language, a crucial part of this inventing or imagin-
ing of a nation is the creation of a belief that the nation has not been invented. Its invention 
must, in other words, be forgotten. For if invented, the nation might be perceived as merely 
artifi cial, arbitrary, contingent in character, thus making its validity seem very shallow 
indeed. Instead the myth must be made that the nation is a natural entity, with a deep-
rooted authenticity that is being rediscovered. If the nation in question has not existed as 
a nation during the whole of recorded history, then its legitimizing myth will be extended 
back into prehistory as far as needed to establish its claim to authenticity. Anderson goes 
on to explain that the nation
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is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comrade-
ship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, 
for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings. (p. 7)
Both of the primary organizational structures which preceded the modern conception of 
the nation, the religious community and the dynastic realm, were vertical rather than 
“horizontal” in arrangement. Authority fl owed downward from God to the supreme human 
authority, whether religious or secular, and thence outward to the rest of the community. 
A hallmark of modern thought was that these vertical hierarchies came to be seen as overtly 
mythical, serving the interests of those at the top and oppressing those at the bottom. And 
so they came to be replaced, in part, by the “horizontal” nation of which every citizen is, 
in a sense, an equal member. The fact of their inhabiting a contiguous territory becomes 
essential, overriding differences of religion, culture, class, and so on. Yet how then to 
motivate people to fi ght, to the death if necessary, on behalf of the nation—often against 
other members of their own religion, for example? This is why the new mythologies were 
required.
It has not been unusual for linguistic difference to be increased, particularly through 
writing, in order to create two distinctive national languages where, from the modern 
linguist’s point of view, there is actually one single language, though the speech commu-
nities involved insist that they differ. A classic case is that of Serbian and Croatian, which 
are mutually comprehensible, differing on a level comparable with dialects of English. But 
they have undergone literary development in a way designed to maximize the appearance 
of difference between them. Serbian, the language of a majority Orthodox Christian nation, 
is written in the Cyrillic alphabet, as Russian is. Croatian, the language of a majority Roman 
Catholic nation, is written in the Latin alphabet, as English is. Linguists often prefer to 
speak of “Serbo-Croatian” as a single language, on the grounds of the lack of linguistic 
distance, but this is not a concept one often encounters among Serbians or Croatians, for 
whom the religious and attendant cultural differences have remained strong enough to 
provoke war and “ethnic cleansing” as recently as the 1990s.
An earlier example is that of Irish and Scots Gaelic, universally recognized as two distinct 
languages, with the Ethnologue database listing as well “Hiberno-Scottish Gaelic,” iden-
tifying it as an “Archaic literary language based on 12th century Irish, formerly used by 
professional classes in Ireland until the 17th century and Scotland until the 18th century.” 
But people in the Gaelic-speaking areas of Scotland up until well into the 17th century 
recognized just one language, which they called Erse (Irish). Only around that time did 
the desire arise to have their own authentic Gaelic, and some of those who shared the desire 
brought it into existence by deliberately writing Gaelic in ways that broke with the norms 
of what today, in retrospect, is called “Hiberno-Scottish Gaelic.” Ever since, the separate-
ness of Irish and Scottish Gaelic has been more immediately apparent on the page than 
to the ear.
Literary development always extends distance and sometimes creates it, not just from 
other related dialects, but even from the dialect base of the very language that is undergo-
ing the building-out process. In the end, though, so long as people believe that their way 
of speaking constitutes a language in its own right, there is a real sense in which it is a 
distinct language. They will probably fi nd ways to “perform” their distinctive linguistic 
identity for the benefi t of others, but ultimately what matters is the imagined community 
of their language and their nation.
In the second half of the 19th century, those Eastern European and Scandinavian nations 
that had lacked a well-defi ned standard language of their own acquired one—or two, in 
the case of Norway’s Nynorsk and Bokmål (the fi rst based more on rural and the second 
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more on literary dialects), and Greece’s demotic and katharevousa (puristic). Meanwhile, 
the older European standard languages, formed during the Renaissance, were subjected 
to a new wave of nationalistically motivated attempts at eliminating variation by establish-
ing a single “correct” usage, based on scientifi c study of the language’s history. This was 
the age of the great modern dictionaries such as the Oxford English Dictionary, the French 
Larousse, and their counterparts in every other major language. These same years witnessed 
the rise of the “history of the language” as a genre, following the plot of national histories, 
where the modern standard language is treated as the perfect expression of the national 
soul and its rise as an inevitable historical good. Those who contributed to its rise are 
portrayed as heroes, while anyone who tried to hold it back, either by sticking conserva-
tively to Latin or by promoting a rival dialect as the vernacular standard, is shown up as 
a knave or a fool.
However, this new wave of standardization also saw attempts to promote other regional 
dialects that had lost out in the initial race to emerge as the national tongue. The Félibrige 
movement in the south of France was a particularly successful example. A new, standard-
ized form of Provençal was promoted through the production of grammars and creative 
literature, notably by the poet Frédéric Mistral. Many others followed this example, in 
the Celtic-speaking areas of the British Isles and France, the Basque and Catalan areas of 
France and Spain, and in other regions throughout Western Europe. This new linguistic 
separatism would continue to fl ourish through the 20th century, though states would dif-
fer in the extent to which they would tolerate regional vernaculars or try to restrict them 
to private contexts. This was also the period in which the revival of Hebrew was being 
discussed and planned by European Zionists—though by no means were all of them 
agreed that Hebrew should be the national language of the eventual Jewish homeland. 
Attempts at standardizing Yiddish, Judeo-Spanish, and Jewish dialects of Slavic and other 
Semitic languages were also underway.
Outside Europe, in the Americas, Oceania, and South Africa, the period saw growing 
recognition of national varieties of Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish, that 
could legitimately follow norms of their own independent of those of the European 
homeland. National language academies sprang up throughout South America in the last 
two decades of the 19th century. In most cases, what appear objectively to be very minor 
differences took on great signifi cance as markers of national identity within the standard 
written language, which continued to be 99% identical with its European counterpart, even 
when, as in the case of Quebec French or Brazilian Portuguese, the spoken form of the 
language (except as used by the educated middle and upper classes) had become largely 
incomprehensible to people in France or Portugal.
In Asia, calls were heard for the traditional written languages, with their centuries 
or even millennia of venerable tradition, to be replaced with an alphabetic system, as 
modernizers looked generally to Western technological methods. These calls would meet 
with success in Indonesia and Malaysia, though not in all countries. For Chinese there was 
a particular obstacle to alphabetization. The system of characters transcended differences 
among the Chinese dialects, which are linguistically as distant from one another as are 
English, German, and Swedish. Alphabetization would have required the choice of one 
dialect as standard—a political and practical impossibility in China until the Cultural 
Revolution of the 1960s.
Modeling Language Nationalism
Various models have been put forward for understanding how language embodies national 
identity (see Joseph, 2004). During the decades of Marxist intellectual dominance, it was 
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inevitably seen as a manifestation of power. Starting in the 1970s, the social identity theory 
developed by Henri Tajfel moved away from such analysis, toward a quasi-structuralist 
identifi cation of social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives 
from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the 
value and emotional signifi cance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). It 
focused on the relative hierarchizations that people seem instinctively to impose on our-
selves, most particularly in our status as members of “in-groups” and “out-groups.”
Tajfel’s sometime collaborator Michael Billig went on to analyze the particular power 
of the half-unnoticed signs of identity that are spread and reinforced daily through the 
symbols on coins and fl ags and, indeed, in forms of language. He defi nes this “banal 
nationalism” as
the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. 
It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have 
supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or “fl agged,” in the lives of its citizenry. 
Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic 
condition. (Billig, 1995, p. 6)
Billig criticizes studies of nationalism for focusing too much on the strongly asserted 
nationalism that is typical only of a small minority of people, ignoring the banal national-
ism that is part of everyone’s everyday life (strong nationalists included).
The idea is often encountered that in present-day “late modernity” we are experiencing 
serious challenges to the modern concept of nation, due to globalization, by which is meant 
the movement of people, capital, and ideas across national boundaries to an unprecedented 
degree. Serious historians of the subject maintain, however, that this is something of an 
illusion, brought on by the fact that the 20th century was a time of unusually high restric-
tions on trade and migration, and that what has happened over recent decades is a return 
to historically more normal conditions. The fact that nations have been able to reground 
themselves in new national languages after having given up their traditional one testifi es 
not to the weakening of the nation as a concept, but rather to its resilience and robustness.
SEE ALSO: Cultural Identity; Language, Politics, and the Nation-State; Language Attitudes 
in Language Policy and Planning; Language Rights in Language Policy and Planning; 
Multilingualism and Language Rights; Role of Language and Place in Language Policy
References
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Refl ections on the origin and spread of nationalism (2nd ed.). 
London, England: Verso.
Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London, England: Sage.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programmes, myth, reality. Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press.
Hutton, C. M. (1999). Linguistics and the Third Reich: Mother-tongue fascism, race and the science of 
language. London, England: Routledge.
Joseph, J. E. (2004). Language and identity: National, ethnic, religious. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Joseph, J. E. (2006). Language and politics. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.
Myhill, J. (2006). Language, religion and national identity in Europe and the Middle East: A historical 
study. Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Smith, A. D. (1998). Nationalism and modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and 
nationalism. London, England: Routledge.
8  nation
Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), 
Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations 
(pp. 61–76). London, England: Academic Press.
Wright, S. (2004). Language policy and language planning: From nationalism to globalisation. 
Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
Suggested Readings
Daftary, F., & Grin, F. (Eds.). (2003). Nation-building, ethnicity and language politics in transition 
countries. Budapest, Hungary: Open Society Institute.
Edwards, J. R. (2009). Language and identity. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Gardt, A. (Ed.). (2000). Nation und Sprache: Die Diskussion ihres Verhältnisses in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
Joseph, J. E. (1987). Eloquence and power: The rise of language standards and standard languages. 
London, England: Blackwell.
Joseph, J. E. (2008). Language and nationalism. In G. H. Herb & D. H. Kaplan (Eds.), Nations 
and nationalisms: A global historical overview. Vol. 2: 1880–1945 (pp. 471–84). Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO.
Kroskrity, P. V. (Ed.). (2000). Regimes of language: Ideologies, polities, and identities. Santa Fe, NM: 
School of American Research Press.
Kymlicka, W., & Patten, A. (Eds.). (2003). Language rights and political theory. Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press.
Mansour, G. (1993). Multilingualism and nation building. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
Mar-Molinero, C. (2000). The politics of language in the Spanish-speaking world: From colonisation to 
globalisation. London, England: Routledge.
May, S. (2001). Language and minority rights: Ethnicity, nationalism and the politics of language. 
Harlow, England: Longman.
Millar, R. McC. (2005). Language, nation and power: An introduction. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Ricento, T. (Ed.). (2000). Ideology, politics and language policies: Focus on English. Amsterdam, 
Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Risager, K. (2007). Language and culture pedagogy: From a national to a transnational paradigm. 
Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
Stroud, C. (2001). African mother-tongue programmes and the politics of language: Linguistic 
citizenship versus linguistic human rights. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 
22(4), 339–55.
Suleiman, Y. (2003). The Arabic language and national identity: A study in ideology. Edinburgh, 
Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.
Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
